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Authentication is the process of confirming an identity. In the context of 
network interactions, authentication involves the confident identification of one 
party by another party. Authentication of users in distributed systems poses 
special problems because, users lack the ability to encrypt and , decrypt. In  
most systems today, the user is  forced to trust the node he wants to use. In  a 
more satisfactory design ,  the user carries a smart card with sufficient 
computing power to assist him. This thesis deals with relatively new methods 
of authentication using a smart card and secure coprocessor. We analyze two 
cases to authenticate a client, depending on the smart card usage. The major 
attacks that affect the smart card and the server are applied to our proposed 
methods of authentication. The result shows that using the proper system 
preparation and proper authentication sequence for our methods the effects 
could be minimized .  
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KAEDAH AUTENTIKASI BAGI TRANSAKSI INTERNET YANG SELAMAT 
MENGGUNAKAN KAD PINTAR DAN PROSESOR BERSAMA YANG 
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Oleh 
MUSTAFA ABDSALAM AYAD 
Pengerusi : V. Prakash,Ph.D. 
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Pengesahan adalah suatu proses pemastian identiti .  Di dalam konteks 
perhubungan menggunakan rangkaian, pengesahan melibatkan pemastian 
identiti suatu pihak oleh pihak yang d ihubungi .  Pengesahan oleh pengguna 
di dalam sistem teragih mempunyai masalah tersendiri disebabkan pengguna 
tidak boleh penyulitan dan menyah sulitan. Kebanyakan sistem pada masa 
ini terpaksa mempercayai pelayan yang ingin d igunakan. Reka bentuk yang 
lebih memuaskan ialah pengguna menggunakan kad pintar untuk membantu 
membuat pengluomputan pengesahan. Tesis ini mengemukakan kaedah 
baru untuk pengesahan dengan menggunakan kad pintar dan pembantu 
pemproses keselamatan. Kami menganalisa dua kes untuk pengesahan 
pengguna, bergantung kepada penggunaan kad pintar. Serangan 
d ilaksanakan ke atas kaedah ini yang cuba mengkompromi kad pintar dan 
pelayan. Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa dengan pengasingan serta 
turutan pengesahan yang betul ,  keberkesanan serangan boleh dikurangkan 
ke tahap yang minima. 
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1 .1 An Overview 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Security in networks of computers is an important issue, although networks 
raise new issues in security, famil iar topics appear in the list of solutions to 
network security problems. The problems are loss of confidentiality, integrity, 
and avai lability. The solutions to these technologies include, encryption, 
access controls, strong authentication, and protocols. In  fact, networks can be 
viewed as more complex example of computing systems. Threats arise at 
d ifferent points based on different technologies, so that many program 
development and operating system security concepts and controls apply to 
networks as well .  Computer networks offer several advantages over single­
processor systems, such as: 
1 .  Resource Sharing. Users of a network can access a variety of 
resources through the network. Sharing databases, data and program 
files, and other resources reduces maintenance and storage costs while 
providing each user with improved access. 
2. Distributing the Workload. The use of single system varies as users join 
and leave a system. The degree of fluctuation of workload for a single user 
can be moderated in a network, so the workload can be shifted from a 
heavily loaded system to an underused one. 
3. Increased Reliability. Because a computing network consists of more 
than one computing system, the fai lure of one system or just one 
component need not necessarily block users from continuing to compute. 
If similar systems exist, users can move their computing to other systems 
when one system fails. 
4. Expandability. Network system can be expanded easily by adding new 
nodes. This expansion of user-base can occur without the manager of any 
single system having to take special action {Pfleeger 1 997}. 
Computing networks have similar characteristics. The network must ensure 
integrity of data, secrecy of data and availabil ity of services. Each user 
accesses the network through a single operating system, which also includes 
network interface responsibilities. Users sti l l  expect the operating systems to 
enforce the security pOlicies of the network. However, in a network the 
operating systems at the two ends of the communication, as well as the 
operating systems of al l  computers in between, must cooperate to enforce 
security (PfJeeger 1 997) . 
1 .1 .1 Motivation 
The security of credit card transactions remains the number one concern both 
for Internet users who have yet to make an online purchase, and for those 
who have performed an online transaction. The US National Consumer 's 
League Internet Fraud Watch (NCL) has reported that American consumers 
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lost over $3.2 million to online scams in 1 999, a 38 percent increase over the 
previous year. The vast majority of cases reported to the NCL involved 
payments by cheque or money order, with credit card transactions accounting 
for only three percent of cases. An online survey in January, March 2000 
found that 41 percent of regular Internet users had shopped online two to four 
times, whi le 22 percent had made one online purchase. Significantly, 1 9  
percent had made over 1 0  online transactions. Due to continued strong 
growth i n  the number of Internet users, it seems likely the total number of 
people shopping online and the proportion of frequent shoppers will continue 
to i ncrease. Internet-related fraud is certainly a matter for concern, and 
authorities around the world are active in combating a range of illegal 
activities being conducted over the Internet. One of the most widely publicized 
cases of credit card fraud occurred in the US, where a group of web-based 
companies made smal l ,  recurrent charges to hundreds of thousands of credit 
cards (Phantom Menace 2001 , Meridien Research 2001 ) .  
I mprovements in  security and encryption technology will make it more d ifficult 
for crim inals to intercept online transactions. Both Netscape Navigator and 
Microsoft Internet Explorer use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) to encrypt data 
before sending it over the Internet. SSL scrambles personal data and provides 
an unbroken key or lock that appears in the bottom of the browser window. 
This technology provides a secure connection that keeps data private during 
transmission over the Internet, however it does not authenticate the parties at 
either end of the transaction. 
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Table 1: Credit Card Statistics- VISA and MasterCard. 
As at Fiscal No. of Cards No. of # Of Cards No. of Cards $ Amount 
Year Ending in Accounts with Reported Fraudulently of 
Oct. 31. Circulation balance Lost or used. Fraudulent 
(Millions). (Millions). Stolen. Accounts 
written off 
(millions). 
1 985 1 4.0 7.3 330,380 21 ,026 $1 7.54 
1 986 1 5.5 7.9 378,239 22,326 $1 8.61 
1 987 1 7.6 8.8 408,239 23,91 3 $1 5.78 
1 988 1 9.4 9.5 460,348 25,773 $1 5.63 
1 989 20.4 1 0.3 522,204 30,91 9 $1 9.20 
1 990 23.2 1 1 . 1  520,716  32,851 $28.90 
1 991 24.3 1 1 .8 623,946 53,968 $44.60 
1 992 24.4 1 2.2 650,088 61 ,234 $63.50 
1 993 25.0 1 2.4 674,988 63,442 $75.20 
1 994 27.5 1 3.2 731 ,052 63,635 $70.60 
1 995 28.8 1 3.6 648,824 66, 1 09 $72.64 
1 996 30.2 14. 1  794,996 77,740 $83.63 
1 997 31 .9 15.0 858,625 89,982 $88.08 
1 998 35.3 1 6.0 895,81 7 1 26,384 $1 04.80 
1 999 37.7 1 7.3 823,934 1 32,836 $1 34. 1 0  
2000 40. 1 1 8.5 805,580 1 1 2,070 $156.38 
2001 44. 1  1 9.6 81 3,624 1 1 6, 1 39 $1 42.27 
VISA International and MasterCard International ,  with support from many of 
the world 's top financial institutions, are presently working to develop a more 
advanced encryption process called Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) . 
SET involves a system of digital certificates provided by card issuers, and 
encryption. It enables the identity of both merchant and cardholder to be 
authenticated, and also ensures that neither the merchant or cardholder 's 
bank sees the purchaser's credit card number (Konrad et al .  2000). 
As shown in Table 1 ,  the number of cards in circulation, the number of 
accounts with balance, the number of cards reported lost or stolen and the 
numbers of cards fraudulently used are increased as the years going on from 
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1985-2001. The number of cards fraudulently used at 1985 is 21,026 cards, 
while it is 116,139 at 2001 (Canadian Bankers Association 2001). 
Enhancement of authentication protocols and encryption technology improved 
the security and makes it more difficult for hackers to intercept or tamper with 
online transactions. We propose the use of smart card and secure 
coprocessor to provide a highly secure environment for the Internet 
transactions. Two methods of authentication are proposed in this thesis, 
which can provide a secure environment for handshaking and secure 
transaction processing .  
1 .2 Threats in Networks 
I n  the fol lowing sections we look to network security issues and reasons for 
network security problems, and security threats considering damage to 
confidentiality, integrity and availabil ity, and then looking to many ways to 
accomplish threats to the network. 
1 .2.1 Network Security Issues 
Networks have several security problems for several reasons. In the next 
sections we wil l  explain each of the reasons, which are causing the network 
security problems. 
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1 .2.1 .1 Sharing 
Because of the resource sharing of networks, more users have the potential 
to access networked systems than single computers. Perhaps worse access 
is afforded to more systems, therefore access controls for single systems may 
be inadequate in  the networks. 
1 .2.1 .2 Complexity of System 
As we know that an operating system is the most complicated piece of 
software ever produced. Reliable security is difficult if not possible on large 
operating system, especially one not designed for security. A network 
combines two or more dissimilar operating systems. Therefore, a network 
operating system/control system is l ikely to be more complex than an 
operating system for single computer system. This compl�xity l imits 
confidence in the security of a network. 
1 .2.1 .3 Unknown Perimeter 
The expand abil ity of a network also implies uncertainly about the network 
boundary. One host may be a node on two different networks, so that 
resources on one network are accessible to the users of other networks as 
well .  Although wide accessibi lity is an advantage, this unknown or 
uncontrolled group of possibly malicious users is a security disadvantage. A 
similar problem occurs when new hosts can be added to the network. Every 
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network node must be able to react to the possible presence of new, 
untrustable hosts. Figure 1 . 1  points out the problems in  defining the 
boundaries of a network. Notice that, users on a host in network D may be 
unaware of the potential connections from users of networks A and B .  
1 .2.1 .4 Many Points of Attack 
A simple computing system is a self-contained unit. Access controls on one 
machine preserve the secrecy of data on that processor. However, when a fi le 
is stored in a network host remote from the user, the fi le may pass through 
many hosts to get to the user. Although the administrator of one host may 
enforce rigorous security policies, that administrator has no control over other 
hosts in the network. The user has to depend on the access control 
mechanism of al l of these systems. 
1 .2.1 .5 Anonymity 
An attacker can mount an attack from thousands of miles away and thus 
never have to touch the system attacked or come into contact with any of its 
administrators or users. The attack can be passed through many other hosts, 
in an effort to disguise from where the attack originated . Finally, computer-to­
computer authentication is not the same as for humans to computers; secure 
d istributed authentication requires thought and attention to detail .  
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1 .2.1 .6 Unknown Path 
There may be many paths from one host to another. Suppose that a user on 
one host wants to send a message to user on another host, that message 
might be routed through different hosts before arriving at destination host. 
Source host may provide acceptable security, but not intermediate nodes. 
Network users seldom have control over the routing of their messages. 
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Figure 1 .1 :  Unclear Network Boundaries 
1 .2.2 Security Threats 
We looked at al l  the parts of a network; considered damage to confidentiality, 
integrity, and availabil ity; and hypothesized the kinds of attack that could 
cause this damage. 
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